In his 1999 essay, "Paralogic Hermeneutic Theories, Power, and the Possibility for Liberating Pedagogies," Sidney Dobrin argues that critical pedagogies should focus on liberating students by empowering them to negotiate the power relations that occur in individual moments of communication. Dobrin situates his argument within post-process theory and maintains that a pedagogy is inherently oppressive if it promotes codified processes, including processes of writing (prewritinglwritinglrevision, and so on) or of cultivating critical consciousness. Such "prescribed processes" deny the agency of individual students by taking care of the naming of the world for them (139). Critical pedagogy could promote "truly liberating possibilities" if critical educators avoid the prescription of process and instead help students resist the "power moves" that occur in individual moments of communication (146). This would allow students to "attain agency in a more direct manner than many liberatory and radical pedagogies profess" because it would prepare them to act at the level of one-to-one communication (146). Dobrin concludes his essay by stating that "students who become more adept at participating" in individual communication are not only more able to resist oppression, but are also empowered to "wield more adequately their will" against others (147). In short, Dobrin's theory locates liberation in the agency of the individual.
jac liberate their students from prescribed processes and from the oppression that can occur within one-on-one communication. Moreover, Dobrin's focus on agency is appealing. How could critical educators not want to help students empower themselves to better interpret and act within individual communication?
At the same time, the implications of such a theory could prove equally as oppressive. One of the dangers inherent in Dobrin's theory is that it privileges individuality at the cost of community, collectivity, and cooperation-ideas central to the pedagogies of educators such as Paulo Freire and Ira Shor. That is, while such a theory might "liberate" students from oppressive processes, it might also promote the belief that liberation means being able to act as opposed to interact, and to "wield more adequately [one's] will" when communicating. Might pedagogies based on such a theory encourage our students not to work with each other, but against each other? Is this the goal of "liberatory" pedagogy?
This begs a larger question: when we speak ofliberatory composition pedagogy in the twenty-first century United States, what do we mean by "liberty"? As a term, "liberty" and its derivatives have become nearly meaningless due to overuse, but the problem we critical educators face is greater than the propagation of benign cliches. In the case of liberty, a concept that undergirds our understanding and development of critical pedagogy, such a loss of meaning is considerable when we consider our material and historical situatedness. Because U.S. history is characterized by romantic visions of rugged, pull-yourself-up-by-your-bootstrap individuality, it is all too easy to conceive of liberty as located primarily in the domain ofthe individual. And, in doing so, we potentially lose sight of critical pedagogy's emphasis on the collective.
Critical pedagogy strives to encourage students to foster awareness of how the actions of individuals and social groups affect the lives and well-being of others. With its connections to feminism, postcolonialism, and cultural studies, critical pedagogy seeks to disrupt socially-constructed ideologies that privilege the few while marginalizing many. In other words, it asks that we consider the various ways in which we necessarily exist within various communities, and how even our "individual" decisions affect others. In this regard, critical pedagogy has a distinctly ethical and interpersonal element to it and seeks to establish democracies in which individuals and groups work collectively for the benefit of all. This resonates with Patricia Bizzell's belief that critical pedagogy promotes "egalitarian social power relations" (55), with Victor Villanueva's hope for "a collective possibility in America's democratic ideals" (121), and with Jennifer Seibel Trainor's contention that such goals can only be achieved through a shared commitment to "social justice projects" (640). In this regard, liberatory pedagogy seeks to raise students' critical awareness of systemic social injustice so that they can then effect change toward a more democratic society. And these visions of democracy are-apropos of the term democracy itself-cooperative, collective, and communal. They are not individualistic.
Herein lies the disconnect: the collective and egalitarian goals of critical pedagogy are undermined by the fact that our discussions of liberty privilege liberation as a primarily individualistic endeavor in which someone is always being freedfrom something. Our North American infatuation with individualism and with freedom as a lack of constraints influences our conception ofliberty and, more insidiously, serves as a Freirean limit situation that prevents critical compositionists from conceiving of liberty in collective terms that emphasize what we are liberated to. As a result, our "liberatory" pedagogies are often not liberatory at all. There is a danger implicit in assuming liberty means little more than individual freedom from constraint or oppression. Dobrin's essay serves as an instructive example of how such an assumption can undermine the egalitarian and collective goals of liberatory pedagogy.
My contention here is that critical educators in the United States need to articulate the concepts ofliberty underlying their liberatory pedagogies. We need to understand the ways in which individualistic liberty-what I will refer to as the incomplete or freedom from conception of libertylimits our ability to conceive of liberty as collective. In naming this as a limit situation, my hope is that we can then transcend it. Most important, due to our cultural and historical situatedness, I argue that we must reconceive of liberty in ways that stress collective action in addition to individual freedom from oppression. In other words, we must define liberty so that it emphasizes not just what we are liberatedfrom, but what we are liberated to-that is, what our liberation calls us to do and to be jac a part of. Doing so would allow critical educators to better reflect upon their existing pedagogies and construct new ones appropriate to the social, material, and historical conditions ofthe United States.
In this essay, I will offer a reconceptualization ofliberty that emphasizes social responsibility by first discussing why critical educators should theorize their concepts of liberty. I will then articulate a more complete understanding of liberty by appealing to discussions ofliberty and freedom within political philosophy, ending with a discussion of why critical educators must continually and critically revisit the concept of liberty.l
The Case for Theorizing Liberty The reasons why critical compositionists, educators, and theorists should theorize liberty are manifold. One reason, as I have already tried to show, is that without theorizing what we mean by liberty-a concept crucial to how we define liberatory pedagogy and terms such as "oppression" and "empowerment"-we run the risk of promoting individualism while discrediting cooperative possibilities. Although I do not think that Dobrin intended to develop a theory that perpetuates such individualism, I do think it is one of the likely implications of a liberatory pedagogy that does not fully consider the concept of liberty upon which it rests. Arriving at such an individualistic understanding ofliberty is made all the more likely due to the fact that we are situated in a wider culture that uncritically promotes such a view of freedom. As I hope to show in this section, it is primarily because of our situatedness that we must redefine liberty as entailing social responsibility. Defined in such a way, liberty will "fit" our North American context because it will allow students and teachers alike to conceive of how the incomplete,/reedom/rom version ofliberty serves as a key limit situation for critical educators.
In "Untested Feasibility: Imagining the Pragmatic Possibility of Paulo Freire," Kate Ronald and Hephzibah Roskelly observe that Freire's definition of "oppression," situated within the historical and material context of Latin American dictatorship and poverty, hinders teachers from envisioning Iiberatory pedagogy as applicable to students in a U.S. context. "My students are hardly oppressed," Ronald and Roskelly quote one compositionist as saying. "They're not like Freire's peasants [ ... ] at all" (615). And these teachers are correct-the vast majority of our students are not like Freire's peasants. However, Ronald and Roskelly appeal to Freire's own words in order to argue that teachers in the U.S must not simply "import" the Brazilian educator's ideas, but need to "recreate and rewrite" them so they fit the local context at hand (612). They go on to say that critical educators "must become participants and insiders in the process of enacting our own kind ofliberatory pedagogy" (615; emphasis added). In other words, critical educators in the U. S. must work to define terms such as "oppression" based on their localized contexts by addressing real questions: How are our students oppressed? How is their oppression different from the oppression faced by Freire's students in Brazil? How might our students achieve critical awareness of the ways they are oppressed?
Theorizing "liberty" is no different than articulating "oppression": we must define such concepts based on our cultural, historical, and material situatedness. But we must do so not only because contexts differ, but also because one of the primary goals of critical education is to foster critical awareness of how social, cultural, and discursive conventions construct the illusion of a static reality that we construe to be unchangeable "givens" of reality. Such illusions create what Freire calls limit situations, those seemingly all-encompassing conditions of existence that seem so permanent as to be absolute. Anthony Petruzzi, in "Between Conventions and Critical Thinking: The Concept of 'Limit-S ituations' in Critical Literacy and Pedagogy," argues that social conventions can produce limit situations "because they are static and veiled within an overwhelming background of local knowledge and practices" (320). In other words, humans can be conditioned to envision conventions as the limits of their reality because they are unaware that possibilities exist beyond the limit situation. To use Freire's words, they are not aware they are "in a situation" (qtd. in Petruzzi 321). One of the goals of liberatory education is to help students recognize and name their limit situations, and to understand that "the meaning generated by social and discourse conventions is always limited and inauthentic because it is a kind of meaning that covers up the ideological roots of a situation" (321). It is only through critical consciousness of such limit situations that students and teachers alike can begin to reflect and act upon their realities. (44 )-is recognized en masse by critical educators. Ira Shor wrines in A Pedagogy for Liberation that U.S. culture is "in love with self-made men" and goes on to say that "our deep roots in individualism" have bred "a Utopian devotion to 'making it on your own,' improving yourself, moving up in the world, pulling yourself up by your own bootstraps, striking it rich by an ingenious personal effort" (Shor and Freire 110) . Aptly labeling such individualism as America's "bootstrap sensibility," Victor Villanueva writes that "America's dominant ideology" consists in large part of "the belief that change is an individual concern" (121). Similarly, Henry Giroux argues that U.S. democracy has developed "an infatuation with individual achievement" ("Resisting" 200). Such individuality, he has recently argued, perpetuates belief in individual self-improvement while concurrently discrediting any hope in social welfare as a collective effort ("From" 529).
More importantly, critical educators have recognized such individualism as contrary to the work of liberatory pedagogy. Giroux and Villanueva both view the ideology of individualism as one ofthe central obstacles to the work of collective or shared democracy (Giroux, "Resisting" 200; Villanueva 121 ). Shor and Freire agree. In discussing the North American fascination with the self-help industry, Shor poses the question, "Does this North American phenomenon of individual answers stand in the way of social empowerment?" Freire's answer is emphatic: "Exactly! Such a literature and cultural endeavor are the opposites of a critical effort for social transformation" (Shor and Freire 113) . A conception ofliberty that privileges individualism-"I can do what I want; this is a free country ! "-limits the ability of students to pursue humanization, which, according to Freire in Pedagogy of the Oppressed, "cannot be carried out in isolation or individualism, but only in fellowship and solidarity" (85).
Although critical educators have recognized North American individualism as standing in the way of liberatory pedagogy, few have engaged in the work of directly theorizing the concept of liberty. In fact, Dobrin's essay suggests that it is all too easy to assume liberty means only freedom from various forms of oppression. Even Petruzzi, who has done much to parse key theoretical concepts in critical pedagogy, seems to adopt an incomplete version of liberty. Toward the end of "Between Conventions and Critical Thinking," he privileges individualism in his argument that "community" and "consensus" are antithetical to one's development of critical consciousness (326-27). Others have privileged the role of individualism in liberation. Lisa Delpit, writing about liberation as it relates to literacy and discourse communities, argues that "individuals have the ability to transform discourses for liberatory purposes" (552). Similarly, Irene Ward uses markedly individualistic language to explain Freire's problem-posing education when she writes that students who achieve critical consciousness "learn to act in the world on their own behalf," thus "freeing themselves" from oppression (97). But what is more problematic is the way in which we speak mostly of liberation as freedom from various forms of oppression-oppressive process theories (see Dobrin) , oppressive iterations of authority (see Bizzell)-and not as what that liberation positively entails. In other words, we have done well to articulate the sources of oppression and constraint, but we have stopped there. Discursively, we have constructedfreedomfrom as the ultimate goal and, in doing so, we have limited our ability to fully articulate what liberty should free us to do and to be a part of.
I am not arguing here that critical educators need to abandon discussion of oppression and of individual agency; I readily agree with Petruzzias well as with John Trimbur and Bernadette Longo-that community and consensus can become oppressive. However, I argue that categorically dismissing the possibility of community in favor of an individualistic freedom from conception of liberty can be equally as oppressive, especially if we lead our students to think they are most liberated if they are able to wield their wills against others. In fact, Freire's discussion of dialogue in Pedagogy of the Oppressed highlights cooperative values such as trust, humility, love, and faith in others as central to the liberatory pursuit of humanization (88-92). We need a theory of liberty that promotes social responsibility and community while retaining the agency jac ofthe individual; we need a theory ofliberty that entailsfreedom to as well as freedom from.
Reconceiving Liberty
In order to theorize such a concept of liberty, I will here appeal to discussions of liberty within political theory. These discussions have import for critical composition pedagogy because they can provide us with a vantage point from which to question our own assumptions and practices. Before I begin, I would like to make it very clear that I am not offering the articulation of liberty that critical compositionists need to adopt. As I have already discussed, the variations among our various contexts make such an absolute move impossible and unproductive. Thus, I offer this articulation of liberty as one that might then be tailored to fit more localized contexts. My hope is that these articulations of liberty-both what it is and is not-will initiate more discussion and critical reflection of the concepts of liberty that undergird our liberatory pedagogies. I hope, too, that this type of discussion will prompt us to investigate other terms and concepts that we may have begun to take for granted. Encouraging more nuanced understandings of our own assumptions and terminology can dramatically invigorate the ways we research, develop, and teach critical composition pedagogy.
In order to analyze key concepts that inform liberty, I draw largely from the political theory of Yves Simon. 2 (I will also appeal to other theorists, such as T.H. Green, Eugene Kennedy, and Freire.) Simon, who moved from France to the United States prior to World War II, was greatly influenced by the abuses offreedom and authority he watched develop in Europe. His book Freedom and Community was reissued by Fordham University Press in 2001 because of its significance to twenty-first century North Americans. As Eugene Kennedy writes in the introduction, Simon's theories address the oversimplified notions of freedom that plague U.S. culture. Specifically, Simon's ideas directly challenge North American assumptions of liberty. Noting that Simon anticipated "the epistemological crisis of our time," Kennedy writes that freedom "has become identified with individual choice, a concept that [has been] promoted as the highest defining right of all Americans" (xi). Kennedy goes on to say that this fetishization of individual choice "in and of itself, shorn of object, circumstances, or consequences, has been glorified as the American way in everything" (xi). It is this very glorification of individual choice that Simon rejects. More importantly-and this is why I have chosen Simon's thought as a source of theorizing liberty for liberatory pedagogy-Simon analyzes and articulates key concepts that should contribute to a more complete understanding of liberty. These concepts, which include authority, autonomy, and the common good, are ideas that I will explore here. But before I offer a concept of liberty that could undergird critical pedagogy, I would first like to consider what liberty is not.
First, liberty is not just freedom from constraint. Simon argues that a freedom from version of liberty-what Kennedy describes as "total immunity from coercion or to the ability to do whatever [Ameicans] want" (xiii)-represents an overly-simplistic view of what freedom actually is. For Simon, "mere free will, mere freedom of choice, has the character only of an initial freedom. It is freedom in its primitive, in its native state" (16). There is, then, nothing inherently wrong with this conception of freedom, except that it is incomplete. However, liberty understood as wholly individualistic could become destructive if it descends to the level of anarchy. Responding to the totalitarian regimes at power in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century, Simon believed that anarchy led to the formulation of despotic governments that work to create the illusion of order "by means of police, spies, and terrorism" (25). In other words, anarchy, which is freedom from in its extreme form, produces oppression, not liberty. To be completely free of constraint could serve to be more constraining-and more oppressivethan to live within the bounds of just laws and principles.
Second, a conception of liberty is incomplete if it entails gaining or sustaining one's freedom at the cost of another. Simon writes that it is nonsense to achieve true liberty without likewise desiring and working toward the liberty of others. In other words, although you might be "free" to selfishly achieve the ends you desire, if you do so at the expense of others, then you have not achieved and are not acting from a legitimate position of freedom. Freire claims something similar, although in milder terms: jac Even when you individually feel yourself most free, if this feeling is not a social feeling, if you are not able to use your recent freedom to help others to be free by transforming the totality of society, then you are exercising only an individualist attitude towards empowerment or freedom. (Shor and Freire 109) And it is precisely this individualist sense of freedom--or freedom from-that, as we have already seen, is incomplete. The implications here extend further. Simon, who was writing in response to the cataclysmic events of the world wars-and later in response to the paranoia of the Cold War-recognized despotism as one of the great threats to freedom. Such despotism grew outofliberalism, the attitude that one should be able to choose what one wishes, even at the expense of others. But to choose to exploit another-to choose to place another in what Simon calls a "dominion of servitude"-is ultimately to force that person to relinquish his or her self-respect and dignity as a human. Doing so effectually alienates that person from partaking in the necessarily human act of defining the common good, which I will discuss below.
At the same time, there are significant repercussions for the oppressor him or herself; as Freire argues, oppressors are themselves oppressed by virtue of the fact that they are working to oppress others (Oppressed 47). In other words, achieving liberty at the cost of another is not liberty at all; it is captivity. As political philosopher T.H. Green writes, liberty is "a power which each man exercises through the help or security given him by his fellow-men, and which he in turn helps to secure for them" (21). In order to foster a complete version of liberty, then, one must want freedom for him or herself and for others. To understand liberty in any other way is to not understand liberty at all, and to base liberatory pedagogy on such an incomplete version of liberty would not promote egalitarianism and freedom for all. Rather, it would possibly lead to the suppression of others by those who can better wield their wills.
Liberty, then, is more than freedom from constraint, and it cannot be achieved at the expense of another. It must entail working with and for others responsibly within community. But how might we conceive of such a version of liberty? What theoretical concepts and terminology might we need? In what follows, I would like to consider some of the frequently misunderstood concepts that inform liberty. In Freedom and Community, Simon talks at length about three concepts he sees as central to the larger concept of liberty. These concepts-authority, autonomy, and the common good-have become practically meaningless in the United States through decades of misuse by the media (Kennedy) . I would like to discuss each in turn, focusing on Simon's understanding of how they work together to comprise a conception ofliberty that entails social responsibility. I submit that analyzing these concepts can help critical educators better define and reflect upon the versions ofliberty underlying liberatory pedagogies.
Authority
Of these three concepts, authority is likely the one most often misunderstood, and that is due to the fact that it is often conflated with authoritarianism. When it comes to liberty and liberatory pedagogy, such a conflation is significant because authoritarianism and liberty are not compatible. It is generally understood that authoritarianism is a form of oppression from which one needs to be I iberated. If authority is misunderstood as authoritarian, then "liberty" and "authority" as concepts are similarly incompatible. However, such a misunderstanding can lead to a graver misunderstanding, one in which liberty is understood as at best a suspicion of all authority and, at worst, a dismissal of it. As I have been arguing in this essay, such a conception of liberty can lead to individualistic iterations of liberatory pedagogy that privilege a freedom from version of liberty.
However, authority and authoritarianism are philosophically distinct. Whereas authoritarianism seeks to subjugate others for one's personal gain, authority seeks to benefit all, a view consistent with Bizzell's "Power, Authority, and Critical Pedagogy." In short, whereas authoritarianism acts selfishly for the benefit of one (or some), authority acts inclusively for the benefit of others. Working in such a way, authority plays out its perfective role, which, according to Simon, means that authority works to engender (or perfect) autonomy in those over whom it has authority. Authority does not work to suppress the will of another, but to develop within that person the ability to think and act ethically, rationally, and justly within the context ofa given community. In order to achieve this, perfective authority must "act mildly" and give "its pronouncements [inJ the form of advice and counsel rather than that of binding precepts" (Simon 55). Thus, being authoritative does not mean commanding or commandeering-it is not authoritarian, and is not contrary to liberty. Rather, authority as a component of liberty entails communicating and facilitating with the best interest of others in mind. And, unlike authoritarianism, it is not something from which one needs to be "liberated."
Of course, as critical educators know, authority can easily lapse into authoritarianism. Simon understood this well: "Persons in authority are always tempted to do more than they are supposed to do" (84). By this, Simon means that it is all too easy for those in authority to fail to realize the level of autonomy others have achieved. This can lead to what Simon refers to as imperialistic authority, the tendency to continue to make decisions for others even though they have achieved the ability to selfgovern. Imperialistic authority subverts the agency of individuals or individual societies. According to Simon, "authority succumbs to its imperialistic temptation whenever it fails to let the governed exercise all the self-government that he [or she J is capable of in every phase of his [or her] development" (86). For authority to be authoritative and not authoritarian, it must fulfill its perfective role. In a statement that sounds almost Freirean, Simon writes that authority deprives its subjects "of the opportunity to exercise [their] ownjudgment" ifit merely deposits within them "ready-made decisions" (55). Authority, then, has a distinctly critical element to it: those in authority must be able to discern when those for whom they are responsible have achieved certain levels of autonomy. Furthermore, whereas authoritarianism "certainly impairs the progress of liberty" in much the same way the banking model of education suppresses inquiry, authority in its perfective function works to achieve liberty and autonomy for others (55). Authority as Simon conceives it is not something from which one needs to be liberated; rather, it works to promote and sustain liberty.
Autonomy
Autonomy is intimately linked to authority. As I tried to show in the previous section, imperialistic authority-or authoritarianism-limits or subverts the autonomy of others. When authority is understood as authoritarian, the tendency is to conceive of autonomy as equivalent to a radically individualistic freedom from notion of liberty-one is autonomous when one is able to be completely free of oppressive authoritarianism. Such a view of autonomy, however, stems from our North American gravitation toward individualism. Simon directly challenges such a view of autonomy:
An attitude of systematic ill will towards laws and regulations, a determination to regard all authority as a necessary evil which should be reduced to a minimum and to which, under any and all circumstances, one will refuse inner respect-these character traits of which individualistic peoples are so proud and which have often been cited as precious guarantees of freedom, appear to us to be nothing but obnoxious attitudes, well calculated to pave the way for despotism. (21) It is clear in this passage that Simon rejects the notion that autonomy represents license or rebellion against law. In fact, Simon discards the idea that autonomy entails radical, individualistic freedom from law or respect for others; autonomy defined as such actually breeds despotism and is therefore directly contrary to liberty. Autonomy as Simon defines it embraces just laws, community, and authority, emphasizing that responsibility for others ought to inform the choices individuals make. Being autonomous does not mean one is "liberated" from authority, laws, or social mores.
For Simon, "[ fJreedom of autonomy is constituted by the presence of law within liberty," and it "is won by a process of interiorization ofthe law" (16). This notion of interiorization is central to Simon's understanding of autonomy, and it is an idea I would like to linger on for a moment. Interiorization is necessary for autonomy. To achieve autonomy is to interiorize or internalize just and natural laws to the degree that one's will is in accordance with those laws; an agent is autonomous "when its law, without being identical to its being, dwells in it and governs it from within, so thatthe spontaneous inclinations of the agent coincide with the exigencies of the law" (18). Although this sounds deterministic, it is not. Whereas determinism means that choices are made for an individual jac outside the bounds of his or her will, Simon's autonomy means that one wills what he or she chooses. It is just that what he or she chooses accords with just laws. This is where freedom of choice and autonomy differ: whereas the former includes the possibility of making wrong decisions, the latter precludes that potential. That is not to say, however, that in every instance there is a clear right and wrong decision to make-for most situations, there are myriad "good" choices, even though some might be better than the others. By "wrong," Simon is clearly addressing a choice that runs contrary eitherto natural law or ajust human-made law (17). The crucial point here is that autonomy, as it connects to liberty, cannot be equated with license and is not attained through the freedom to make choices outside the boundaries of just laws. Of course, when laws are established that are not just, communities have the responsibility to work toward redefining such laws so they are just. The process of collectively defining laws could work in accord with the establishment ofthe common good, which I will discuss in my next section.
Still, the concept of interiorization is one that many critical educators would find unsettling. As a concept, interiorization seems to imply an uncritical, instinctual response in choice-making. On one level, this could be true. In fact, my central concern in this essay deals with the way in which North Americans have habitualized oversimplified definitions of liberty. In that regard, one could posit similarity between the concepts of interiorization and limit situations; both could work to reify a version of reality that human subjects conceive of as permanent, leading them to construe such socially constructed mores as reality itself. However, whereas such limit situations serve only to limit, interiorization can be used to foster critical awareness. In fact, I would imagine that most critical educators desire to see their students interiorize (or habitualize) the ability to think critically within various situations, including those in which students as citizens are engaged in academic, political, and public discourse. As students of critical composition pedagogy, they would become autonomous when they desire to draw on their own critical awareness in various contexts because they see its merit for themselves. Similarly, most critical educators desire to see their students interiorize egalitarian principles of justice and democracy so that students willingly choose to act in accordance with the principles of a truly democratic society. This is not to say that they wish to create limit situations in which students automatically think that way as if they were programmed to do so. Rather, interiorization as I conceive of it complements Freire's notion of praxis-critically aware, we define ways in which we can effect changes upon our realities, but we also do so while critically analyzing our motives and practices.
Understood in such a way, autonomy informs a version of liberty that invo lves commitment to one's community, to the just and natural laws of that community, and to figures of authority. Autonomy as Simon conceives of it is not the same as radical individualism. Also, because it emphasizes egalitarian relations among individuals in a given society, autonomy resonates with the collective aims of critical pedagogy. In fact, one of Simon's most direct assertions-"To want my autonomy without wanting that of my companions and that of our community is nonsense" (27)-parallels Freire's assertion that humanization must be pursued "in fellowship and solidarity" (Oppressed 85). Unfortunately, this is one of the values often undercut by the pervasive conception of autonomy and freedom as purely individual pursuits. Due to our cultural situatedness, it is all too easy to adopt a freedom from version ofliberty that will then inform our liberatory pedagogies. But as Dobrin's example suggests, adopting such a view ofliberty can lead to theories ofliberatory pedagogy that reinforce individualism without taking into account social responsibility. But socially responsible liberty would have as its goal the pursuit of a common good, which works in conjunction with authority and autonomy.
Common Good
For Simon, a common good is more than a goal "intended by a group of people." Rather, it is "an end of such a nature that it has to be intended in common and achieved through common action" (54). Thus, a common good is not imposed upon individuals or groups in society, and a common good cannot serve the benefit of one (or some) at the expense of others. A common good is common indeed-collectively defined, collectively brought about, and, as I will suggest later, collectively and critically reexam ined. In this, a common good has the power of un ifying those who strive for it, including autonomous individuals, those on the road to jac autonomy, and those in authority. And, because the common good is common, it is achieved not by the despotic desires of some or by the radically individualistic tendencies of others, but by the cooperation of all.
Critical pedagogy has numerous goals that could fall under the heading of a common good, but the one that I have based my argument on is the vision of an egalitarian, democratic society in which all work willingly for mutual benefit. Such a socially aware iteration of a commonly defined good can only be achieved through an equally common reconceptualization of liberty as socially responsible. But what is most important to understand here is not what a specific common good is, but how it can be named. This is consistent with Simon's position on the common good; he never defines it because he understands that it must originate within specific communities and contexts (see Ronald and Roskelly) . It is outside of the scope ofthis paper-and of the definition of the common good-to define one here. However, what does seem appropriate is a discussion of how one could be established, and to do so I will tum to Freire's understanding of dialogue in order to focus on how a community ought to arrive at its own definitions.
Broadly conceived, Freire defines the common good toward which liberatory pedagogy ought to work as the humanization of all humankind. This "vocation of humanity" is marked by justice, freedom, autonomy, and responsibil ity, and involves not just the liberation of one or some, but of all, oppressed and oppressor alike. Thus, humanization as a common good is common indeed. As I have already quoted Freire as saying, humanization is "the pursuit of full humanity" and "cannot be carried out in isolation or individualism, but only in fellowship and solidarity" (Oppressed 85). And whereas such fellowship can exist on a national or even global scale, it is also true (and more likely) that such solidarity will exist in more localized communities. Regardless, in order to be truly liberating or humanizing, this fellowship must be characterized by dialogue, a process that would allow individuals in communities to collaboratively establish and critically reflect upon their common goals.
Freirean dialogue is characterized by several virtues. First, dialogue necessarily entails love for others and the world. This love is neither sentimental nor manipulative; rather, Freire defines this love as "commitmentto others and commitmentto "the cause ofliberation" (89). Second, Freire asserts that humility is necessary for dialogue. "How can I dialogue if I am closed to-and even offended by-the contribution of others?" Freire asks, incriminating self-sufficiency as one of the enemies of true dialogue. Third, dialogue presumes that subjects will hold a priori faith in the ability of other subjects to become "more fully human" (90). Lack of this faith in others, warns Freire, leads to counterfeit dialogue that "inevitably degenerates into paternalistic manipulation" (91). The presence of these elements within Freirean dialogue develops trust within the subjects that "leads the dialoguers into ever closer partnership in the naming of the world," and is completed by the hope that those engaged in such dialogue will become more fully human (91). Engaged in true dialogue, individuals honor both themselves and those with whom they dialogue because the vocation of humanization is neither self-serving nor self-deprecatory, but common. It is the work in which all should be engaged, and it culminates in a collective process of naming the world, one aspect of which could be to name a common good. Although Simon does not directly discuss such a framework for dialogue, his emphasis on community and collectivity accord well with Freirean dialogue.
When taken together, these concepts of authority, autonomy, and the common good inform a version of liberty that embraces social responsibility; it does not define liberty as primarily freedom from constraints or oppression, and it does not envision authority, laws, or mores as de facto conditions from which one needs to be "liberated." Rather, such an understanding of liberty embraces and emphasizes commitment to others-and to common goals-within the context of a given community. However, what might such a community look like? Simon suggests that labor unions provide us with a recognizable model. Admitting that unions, like all human institutions, have the potential to become corrupt and oppressive, Simon nevertheless points to them as having great potential for the practice of freedom within community. He draws four principles from the example of unions, using autonomy as his starting place: jae Autonomy resists individuality, if individuality goes against the common welfare; autonomy embraces community; autonomy resists despotism and thus embraces just laws; and, autonomous communities have a responsibility to interact with other communities autonomously. (27) (28) Clearly, the concepts at work here-authority, autonomy, and the common good-collectively represent a version ofliberty that is a far cry from the oversimplified,freedom from version of liberty.
At the same time, such a view of liberty by no means seeks to erase individual difference. Rather, it seeks to challenge the notion that freedom entails the seeking of one's own good regardless of the concern for others. It holds as its banner the good of the community and calls for individuals and communities to understand the differences between authority and authoritarianism, autonomy and liberalism, and notions of common good and private gain. Moreover, this reconceptualization of liberty resists the idea that a liberatory pedagogy would be more liberatory than if it allowed its students to better wield their wills in individual moments of communication. It also brings into question the tendency for critical educators to envision liberatory pedagogies as always freeing their students (and themselves)from something.
In this, liberty once achieved-for an individual, for a community, for a nation-is not liberty eternally. As Simon writes, "Freedom is impregnably assured only by an effort to conquer it which is renewed every day," a statement that rings true in the twenty-first century (2). Simon's words parallel Freire's call to continually reevaluate and critically reflect upon one's actions. Liberty as envisioned by Simon and Freire cannot be equated withfreedomfrom constraint, law, authority, or responsibility. Liberty requires that individuals engage with others in the common work of pursuing full humanity for all.
Toward Community, Liberty, and Praxis I have attempted to argue in this essay that liberatory pedagogy in the United States, in order for it to be liberatory, needs to adopt and promote a view ofliberty as socially responsible. This would necessari Iy entail the freedom to work with and for others in community, the freedom to work toward a common and commonly defined good, and the freedom to understand that liberty entails authority and autonomy, not rebellion and license. In its simplest form, such a view of liberty calls for individuals to act altruistically, not selfishly. Such liberty does not call for individuals to act as automatons, their actions determined by the various systems of government and of community in which they find themselves implicated. In other words, such a view of liberty by no means calls for determinism and hegemony. Similarly, it does not call for blind acceptance of community-based ideals that might subjugate certain individuals while privileging others, and it does not advocate an uncritical acceptance of community-based views that might serve to oppress other communities. Bernadette Longo argues that community and community-based consensus, especially in the wake of a catastrophe like 9/11, can serve as an impetus for coercion. In this regard, community acts divisively, granting access to those who adopt its ideals while expelling those who do not. When I say that we ought to adopt a view of liberty that entails authority, autonomy, and a common good-a socially responsible, freedom to version of liberty-I am not advocating we embrace the type of community consensus Longo decries.
Rather, the idea of community that liberty espouses is one in which autonomous, critically-reflective individuals work to define, bring about, and then critically reflect on definitions of the common welfare and public good. In this sense, I argue for a version ofliberty that necessitates Freirean praxis, the coupling of action and reflection that occur repeatedly and continuously. That is, once a common good has been estab lished and set into motion, the community, as individuals and as a collective, needs to inspect and reinspect it. Is it working? Whom is it privileging? Whom is it leaving out? How can we change it for the better? Such a process of critical reflection, like the process of naming a common good, needs to occur dialogically and democratically.
In fact, such critical reflection is precisely what I am arguing for here: critical pedagogues in the United States need to critically reflect on the versions of liberty underpinning their theories and pedagogies. Moreover, liberatory pedagogies need to counteract the tendency in our country to define liberty asfreedomfrom; we need to work with each other and with our students to move beyond the limiting notion that freedom jac privileges individuality over community, resistance over dialogue, rebellion over authority,freedomfrom over freedom to. I agree with Villanueva that individualism should not be erased, but I also agree with him that its encouragement "needs to be balanced by a recognition of, and a change in, the conditions that effect us all" (121). In light of that, I suggest that critical pedagogy in the United States direct its energies toward promoting a concept of liberty that stresses the freedom to work collectively, critically, and democratically toward the common good we're all striving for-a dialogic community in which individuals and communities work together for the benefit of alP
Notes
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Durham, New Hampshire 1. I will use the terms "liberty" and "freedom" interchangeably, a la political theorist David Miller.
2. I am aware that appealing to a political philosophy written by someone not native to the United States and several decades removed may seem to some as contrary to the earlier part of my argument that we need to develop theories and pedagogies based on our own context. Would it not make more sense to appeal to contemporary political theorists from the U.S.? Although one could easily make this argument, I would argue that, in the same way that we must rewrite and recreate Freire's pedagogical ideas, we much also rewrite and recreate political philosophies such as Simon's. Furthermore, because the idea of a singular, North American context is a myth, even a contemporary North American political theory would have to be recreated for the various regional and local sociopo litical contexts within the United States.
3. I would like to thank Paul Kei Matsuda and Jessica Enoch for their insightful revision suggestions. I would also like to thank my fellow graduate students at the University of New Hampshire for the many helpful discussions we've had about this topic.
